ABSTRACT: In his book The Socialist Case, first published in 1937, Douglas Jay wrote: 'in the case of nutrition and health, just as in the case of education, the gentleman in Whitehall really does know better what is good for people than the people know themselves.' This phrase became notorious, and, as a result, Jay's views on economic planning and consumer choice have frequently been misrepresented. Far from wanting to dictate to people what they should consume, Jay was a planning sceptic who believed that the price mechanism had many virtues. The experience of World War II, however, convinced him of the merits of central planning, and this was reflected in key changes he introduced to the new edition of The Socialist Case, published in 1947. The changed role envisaged for Jay's 'gentleman in Whitehall' not only illustrates important points about the impact of war on the Labour Party's attitudes to planning and consumer sovereignty, but also casts light on the relationship between the socialist revisionism of the 1930s and that of subsequent decades. addressed: the overall context of the remark changed. 9 The purpose of this article,
therefore, is to explore in detail, via comparison of the two editions, the way in which his opinions on this, and the related issues of planning and the price mechanism, evolved.
The changed role envisaged for Jay's 'gentleman in Whitehall' not only illustrates important points about the impact of WWII on the Labour Party's attitudes to planning and consumer sovereignty, but also casts light on the relationship between the socialist revisionism of the 1930s and that of subsequent decades.
For The Socialist Case is not merely known as the vehicle for an infamous remark, but also as a seminal work marking a departure from the Labour Party's traditional ideology.
Much, in particular, has been made of the book's 'Keynesianism'. 10 Even if this has been exaggerated, 11 the book undoubtedly did differ in important respects from contemporary mainstream Labour economic thought. Noting this, some historians have seen the work of Jay, and other Labour 'young economists' with similar inclinations, as providing 'the intellectual inspiration for the party leadership in the 1940s and 1950s'. 12 As Ben Pimlott has put it, the 1930s revisionism of Jay, Durbin, Hugh Gaitskell, Colin Clark and others 'eventually became dominant in Labour Party thinking ... embryonic "Gaitskellites" 'Marshall, so it seemed to me, offered the secret of the whole controversy in lucidly explaining that in a pure laissez-faire system, despite its genuine merits, the demand represented by the rich man's pound would tend to be over-weighted in terms of need as compared with the poor man's pound -a basic truth which fully explained the worst human consequences of laissez-faire, but whose significance was often neglected both by some Marxists and the orthodox followers of Adam Smith.' 15 He was therefore attracted by Hugh Gaitskell's ideas on the inefficiency and injustice of the financial system, and in particular by his contribution to G.D.H. Cole's edited collection What Everybody Wants to Know About Money (1933) . 16 The contacts with Gaitskell that followed helped bring Jay into the Labour movement in an active role, as did the patronage of Hugh Dalton. 17 Jay joined the New Fabian Research Bureau (hereafter NFRB), participated in the activities of XYZ (Labour's unofficial group of financial experts), and served on various sub-committee's of the Labour Party's National Executive Committee. 18 In January 1937, Jay started work as City editor of the Daily Herald. The Socialist Case was published later the same year. After the outbreak of war in 1939, Jay remained at the First that the case for greater social justice tested on Alfred Marshall's "broad proposition" that "aggregate satisfaction can prima facie be increased by redistribution of wealth, whether voluntarily or compulsorily, of some of the property of the rich among the poor", and had been sadly distorted by Marx's obsession with ownership and out-dated theory of value. Secondly that there was no rational ground for believing re-distribution could not be peacefully and democratically achieved. Thirdly that unemployment and cyclical depression were monetary phenomena which could be overcome by intelligent management of what I boldly labelled "total effective demand". I called the book The Socialist Case to emphasize the extent to which Marx was a revisionist, whose dogmatism and stridency were not shared by earlier socialists such as Robert Owen. 21 One of the most interesting things about the book, however, was its approach to planning, the price mechanism, and its comparatively positive attitude to consumer choice. This must be seen in context of the Labour Party's adoption, after its disastrous election defeat in 1931, of a concept of the planned economy based on nationalisation and physical controls. Allied to this was the widespread, but not unanimous, belief that consumer sovereignty was an unimportant luxury, at least while the poorest people in society were in want of necessities. As Dalton stated in at a Fabian Society conference in 1934, 'It was pedantic to think consumers' preference important so long as there was great poverty. A dictatorship of consumption was desirable ... There would be less dislocation on the producers' side if the caprice of consumers' expenditure were controlled.' Some voices, such as that of Durbin, were raised against this. 22 In The Socialist Case, Jay's attitude to consumer choice was in some ways equivocal, but his willingness to speak up in favour of it at all put him, with Durbin, very much in the minority.
In Chapter XXVIII ('Redistributive expenditure'), Jay argued that the money raised in a socialist state via higher taxation should be distributed to the poor partly in kind and partly in money. He claimed that 'ignorance distorts the working of consumers' choice ...
where primary necessities are concerned the State will normally be a better judge than the spender of the family's income'; when a family was too poor to afford housing, heating, sanitation, health services, education, food and clothes, 'the State should supply them out of the unearned income at its command.' Over and above this provision of primary necessities, however, money should be distributed to the poor -in the form of pensions, family allowances, or through the remission of regressive taxation -'and the advantages of free consumers' choice retained.' 23 As will be seen, Jay gave a rather more ringing defence of the principle of choice later in the book. Moreover, he put himself strikingly in the minority, not merely by speaking positively about consumer freedom (with key exceptions), but also by showing himself comparatively sceptical about the idea of economic planning in general.
In 26 The central message of the book, summarised by Hayek, was that 'to-day we are not intellectually equipped to improve the working of our economic system by "planning" or to solve the problem of socialist production in any other way without considerably impairing productivity'; any attempt to abolish, or even substantially amend, the free market was bound to be economically disastrous. 27 Naturally, Jay did not accept this conclusion in its entirety, but he was prepared to make key concessions to Hayek's point of view.
This was shown in Chapter XXIX, entitled 'Should we interfere with the price system?'.
Here, in line with arguments made earlier in his book, Jay posited a world in which all unearned income would be gradually falling as a result of inheritance-taxation, into the hands of the State, in which many large industries would be operated by public corporations working mainly on the price and profit principle, in which vast numbers of small entrepreneurs would still be working on that principle, in which inequalities of earned income would be slightly but not much less than now, and in which consumers' choice would be absolutely free. ...
Such an economic system, in which free prices, free consumers' choice, and free competition are retained unimpaired, but unearned income is being gradually distributed in social services, is a perfectly conceivable system. ... we may regard it as a half-way house towards socialism. 28 Nevertheless, he believed that it was theoretically desirable to go further; for in the 'halfway house' the remaining inequalities of earned incomes, together with the still-existing tendency to monopoly, would mean that the 'fundamental misdirection of resources'
resulting from a completely free system of exchange would still prevail. 'It seems desirable, therefore, that we should proceed beyond the mere abolition of unearned incomes, and if practicable make at least some alteration in the working of the price system itself.' 29 Here, however, came the caveats.
For interference with the price mechanism, Jay went on to argue, 'raises some fundamental difficulties, which socialists, it must be admitted, have hitherto been inclined to ignore.' Socialists had traditionally been vague about how their proposed economic system would actually work. For 'it is plain that the automatic price system, though it misrepresents real needs and therefore fails to bring about a really "economic" arrangement of production and distribution, nevertheless does bring about some arrangement'; socialists thus had a positive duty to demonstrate that socialism could 'produce the right things in the right quantities.' Hayek et al had 'clearly if rather aggressively' stated a key problem -namely that if socialism arrived at an 'uneconomic' rather than an 'economic' distribution of resources, this could mean the difference between scarcity and plenty. 30 Nevertheless, Jay did not allow the anti-planners to have it all their own way. The weakness, as he saw it, of the arguments in Collectivist Economic Planning was that the authors assumed throughout that an 'economic' distribution of resources meant a distribution in accordance with money demand, as it manifested itself under the existing economic system. That is to say, they took social and economic inequality for granted, and assumed that the allocations of resources that flowed from it were necessarily rational, and that attempts to reduce it would lead to outcomes that were necessarily irrational. Moreover, Jay detected that the anti-planners had, over time, been subtly shifting their ground. For example, Mises (whose essay was originally published in 1920)
'pronounces any defection from the price system to be "impossible". Professor Hayek, writing after the Russian experiment, explains that this means any "rational" or "successful" defection to be impossible. He thus jumps from one hot brick to another.' 31 Nevertheless, Jay went on to make yet more striking concessions to the Hayekian point of view. He wrote: 'To abandon the price index as the determinant of how much of each commodity is to be produced is to introduce authoritarian human direction into the system.' (Jay defined the 'question-begging' word 'planning' as the substitution of such direction for the price system.) The price system itself was also authoritarian, in that it did not reflect real needs; 'but in arguing that the price index is the only practical method of getting economic decisions reached at all' the anti-planners were on fairly strong ground:
Imagine, as Professor Hayek quite legitimately imagines, a central economic body which has abandoned the price system entirely ... Such a body would have to know months in advance the exact preference of every individual for so many chocolates rather than peppermints, apples rather than oranges, cinemas rather than football, at all times of the day on every day throughout the year. ... the problem would be utterly beyond dispute impossible; and socialists had better admit this quite unequivocally. need.') Therefore, the chapter concluded, 'the wiser course would seem to be not, like the Russians, to abolish the price system outright and then reintroduce it wherever its absence was obviously disastrous, but rather to preserve it and modify it bit by bit in all those ways in which modification is indisputably justifiable.' 33 Chapter XXX, 'Cost and prices in a socialist community', outlined Jay's views on how this might be done, and also contained the 'gentleman in Whitehall' remark. In answer to his own question, 'how should a socialist community determine the production and consumption of goods?', Jay argued that the most crucial issue to be decided was the value of free consumer choice.
Socialists have been inclined to depreciate the value of free consumers' choice for no better reason than that it has been used as a hypocritical defence of the unregulated price system. ... Gross inequality ... turns consumers' choice into a mockery. But may not the solution be to mitigate inequality rather than to abandon consumers' choice? 34 Jay pointed out that it would be irrational either to completely abolish or completely accept in all spheres the principle of consumer choice. By general consent, he suggested, there were certain areas, such as education and health, where the collective judgement of the community was more trusted than the unfettered decisions of individuals; hence society's willingness to spend on these areas out of taxation, and to lay down other rules, In 'neutral' circumstances, then, when no question of inequality or other moral issue arose, the value of free consumer choice was almost impossible to overestimate: 'To a large extent, in these circumstances, it is freedom and it is happiness.' (Emphasis in original.) 36 Jay's guiding planning principle, therefore, was to permit the price index to work in all 'neutral' cases, and to adjust its working wherever inequality or some other social need made such adjustment necessary. As many important social needs, such as education and justice, were already 'planned' by the state, the 'most pressing necessity at present is consequently for a modification of the price system directly designed to reduce inequality'. In order to achieve this, all commodities and services produced in the community should be classified as either necessities, luxuries, or 'neutral goods'. Having done this, Jay suggested, the planning authority had various options before it. It could simply redistribute money incomes in the form of family allowances, etc., 'and trust to luck that working-class housewives would spend the money on "necessities"'. But although he believed that this would be a logical way of diminishing inequality while preserving maximum consumer choice, there were also, he suggested, powerful arguments against the exclusion of all other methods. Then came the crucial passage:
housewives as a whole cannot be trusted to buy all the right things, where nutrition and health are concerned. This is really no more than an extension of the principle according to which the housewife herself would not trust a child of four to select the week's purchases. For in the case of nutrition and health, just as in the case of education, the gentleman in Whitehall really does know better what is good for people than the people know themselves. 37 Therefore, as well as enabling poorer people to consume necessities, there was also a need to induce (and even compel) them to do so. Thus, whereas the production and sale of all neutral goods should be left to the working of the price system, the production of necessities should be subsidised out of taxes on the production of luxuries. This would 'gradually transfer resources from the luxury to the necessity industries without involving the planners in any impossible decisions about the scale of production of every commodity in every year.'
38
The first edition of The Socialist Case, hardly surprisingly, was by no means a paean to the virtues of the market or to consumerism for its own sake. There was an obvious paternalist element in Jay's attitude to the working class. Moreover, there may be an element of truth in Francis's view that the context of the 'gentleman in Whitehall' remark 'clearly reveals Labour's ... hidden assumptions about the essential "infantilism" of women.' 39 (Jay had some defence against the charge of sexism, however, in that, as seen above, he believed that men too tended to be ignorant of the necessities their families needed.) Yet, even so, Jay was adamant that working men and women should retain a wide measure of freedom in their decisions about what to consume. His argument for state intervention in some areas of consumption was clearly offered as a qualification to an overall argument which stressed both the virtues of consumer choice and the limits and dangers of planning itself. As Jay put it in Chapter XXXII, 'The limits of planning', the penultimate chapter of the book, democratic governments found themselves on innumerable occasions in conflict with the vested interests of monopolistic capitalism.
But 'The transformation of this conflict into a real régime of socialist planning will be justifiable exactly in so far as greater security and equality are purchased at the expense of existing monopoly interests and not at the expense of the freedom of the consuming masses.' 40
Reviews and reactions
Jay found the reception of his book 'unexpectedly heartening'. 41 Even the Times was polite, 42 and the Economist (Jay's former employer) noted that the book was honest, practical and undoctrinaire, although 'Purists, perhaps, may doubt Mr. Jay's Socialism and dub him rather an enlightened democrat'. 43 The Times Literary Supplement likewise commended Jay's 'persuasiveness and moderation'; but also noted that Jay's acknowledgement of the strength of Mises' argument against tampering with the price system 'would not be accepted by the majority of contemporary Socialists, who prefer to ignore or deny the difficulties raised by Professor Von Mises rather than squarely to face them and admit their weight.' 48 Hobson, writing in the Manchester Guardian, summarised Jay's argument: 'The absorption by the State of ownership and control of monopoly and key industries must proceed apace, but care must be taken to keep this administration free from the central bureaucracy of Whitehall and to allow an improved price system the free play required to meet the choice of consumers.' The Socialist Case was 'the most thoughtful, unbiased, and well-informed case for a British Socialism that has yet appeared.' solving the problem of inequality; he was likely also to have been gratified at Jay's adoption of his variation of the Rignano death duty scheme. 51 Nevertheless, like so many other socialist reviewers, he was likely to have had reservations, whether or not he expressed them publicly. In 1935, he had stated his opposition to 'Unplanned Socialism', which he found 'of theoretical interest only, combining public ownership of the means of production with free movement of all prices.' 52 Jay, of course, did not advocate the free movement of all prices, but his argument that the price mechanism should only be modified bit by bit perhaps came close to the view that Dalton had caricatured. Jay, like his NFRB colleagues Gaitskell and Durbin, was remote from the Labour Party machine and the parliamentary process, and thus depended on Dalton for influence. 53 In some instances, for example over the question of rearmament finance, Jay's ideas had previously been taken up through this channel; 54 I became a communist supporter in 1931, because I saw no way through the dilemma that the moment a democratic socialist policy began to be implemented, the economy got into crisis ... and so democratic socialist governments were bound to be impotent. Keynes and your own group -Douglas [Jay] , Evan Durbin and yourself, and the experience of the New Deal, had converted me by 1940 to the view, which I put forward in a book called Programme for Progress, that a way through did exist. 56 Clearly, Jay was not solely responsible for Strachey's conversion back to social democracy; but Strachey's comments to Gaitskell show that his book had, at least, had a rather more tangible effect than could be claimed for many 1930s socialist tracts. The coming of WWII, however, would lead to a significant shift in Jay's own views.
The development of Jay's thinking, 1939-46
In the 1947 lecture mentioned above, Jay argued that the years since 1940 had 'shown the remarkable power of large-scale organisation at its best.' In spite of his previous doubts about the ability of the government to control large sections of the nation's economic life, it had now been proved that, in a highly organised democracy like Britain, the job of planning could be done after all. 57 Moreover, whereas in The Socialist Case he had been somewhat hesitant about the use of term 'planning' itself (preferring in places to repeat instead the clumsy phrase 'interference with the price system'), 58 by 1945 he had latched on to its value as a slogan. 59 His civil service experiences did not lead him to become harshly dirigiste, however. At the Ministry of Supply he soon learnt that 'despite all the wartime powers of so-called "direction" of labour, and the Essential Work Order supposedly holding people in existing industries, it was in fact pay differentials that were more effective than any other single weapon in moving large blocks of labour quickly, as we had to, from one form of production to another.' 60 In December 1945, he pressed
Attlee to state 'firmly and formally' that government controls over labour would not continue permanently. 61 Nevertheless, Jay was by no means an absolute planning minimalist. At this time, there was an emerging division amongst civil servants between 'Thermostatters' (who wanted to plan in terms of aggregate demand management) and 'Gosplanners' (who favoured more direct physical planning). Meade, whose work had earlier been a key influence on Jay, was the leading light of the former group. 62 Jay's position in relation to the controversy was ambiguous. In November 1945, he expressed general support for Meade's approach, which he found 'admirable'. Yet at the same time he offered an important criticism:
To suppose that in peacetime in future we should leave the great bulk of economic decisions to be determined by the haphazard effect of competing consumers' demands on the basis of unequal incomes, and to make a few 'State interventions' on the basis of special criteria such as nutrition, is to misunderstand the problem. The right course is for the State (a) to decide on a plan for production and consumption at a high level of all the main necessities and some of the amenities of life, and (b) to leave certain luxury commodities and trades alone to the hapazard influence of market prices, private monopolies etc. Necessities should no longer be left to the mercy of these haphazard forces. This conception of a guaranteed minimum of consumption for all, together with full employment, should be the guiding principles of the whole planning process. 63 Moreover, Jay's maiden Commons speech of October 1946, which dealt with problems in the coal industry, suggested that 'some definite targets might be set ... both for production and manpower in this industry. The very attempt to set targets is salutary, because it brings home to one how serious the outlook is.' 64 These comments located him, to some extent, in the territory staked out by the Gosplanners -although it should be stressed that this group's objectives were nowhere near as drastic as its name (a reference to the Soviet planning agency) suggests. His sometimes conflicting impulses notwithstanding, Jay clearly now had an increased enthusiasm for central planning, and this would be reflected in the second edition of the Socialist Case, published in 1947.
The second edition of The Socialist Case
The new edition seems to have been ready by November 1946, the date that Jay put to his introduction. In that introduction, Jay wrote:
Five years' practical acquaintance with the Government's efforts to organize industry, first for the war effort and then for reconstruction, has convinced me that the case for Socialism, and in particular for conscious economic planning of the economic system, is stronger than appeared to me writing in a more philosophic, or academic, spirit nine years ago. Then I knew it to be desirable, and believed it to be practicable. Now I know it is both practicable and necessary ... after the Russian experiment, but before the war', had argued that any rational or successful defection from the price system was impossible. But 'After the experience of 1941-5, it is less easy to argue that Russian economic life is not "rationally" or "successfully" organized!' 68 As seen above, the original final paragraphs of the chapter had argued that planning would introduce authoritarian human direction into the system, had spelled out the immense difficulties faced by a central planning body, had suggested that to abandon the price system entirely would lead to a worse misdirection of resources than to obey it entirely, and had said that the price system should only be modified bit by bit. In the second edition, these paragraphs were completely omitted. In their place came the following:
The truth is that the defenders of laissez-faire are on utterly weak ground in (1) regarding money demand as a fair test of need, and (2) in thinking that a struggle between private producers, unregulated by the State, leads to competition and a "system" of prices. ... Therefore whenever some rationally recognizable human value is at stake, such as housing, nutrition, education, health or employment, we should organize deliberately for the attainment of it -i.e. "plan", if the word is preferred. Only when purely personal preferences between inessentials are involved should we be content with the haphazard price scramble. [Emphasis in original.]
This, Jay now argued, was the basic reason for proceeding from redistribution of incomes to central planning of production, employment and consumption on a nation-wide scale.
'And even though we remember that the planners are human, the experience of 1940-47
in Great Britain has shown again that over a wide field far better results -not merely for production but for general consumption -can be achieved by such planning than by laissez-faire.'
69
Significant changes were also made to Chapter XXX. However, with the exception of the insertion of a paragraph stressing the need to move labour to essential industries through the adjustment of wage differentials, 70 the first part of the chapter, up to and including the 'gentleman in Whitehall' remark, remained more or less unaltered. That is to say, Jay's advocacy of the principle of consumer choice, and his strictures against universal planning of consumption, remained in place. Nevertheless, they were cast in a rather different light both by his earlier remark in favour of planning 'not merely for production but for general consumption', and by changes in the subsequent paragraphs. Drawing on wartime experience, he now specified further methods, other than the redistribution of money incomes and subsidies for the production of necessities, by which the price process could be adjusted in favour of the poorer. These methods were rationing, price control, and 'utility' production. Moreover, whereas the first edition had stated that it was unquestionably best to leave the production and sale of almost all 'neutral' goods to the working of the price system, now Jay thought it merely 'best in many cases.'
Furthermore: 'While regarding money costs as a rough guide to real costs, we must repudiate altogether the idea that the price of a necessity must depend on the producers'
incomes, e.g. the price of coal on miners' wages.' Therefore, 'In general ... we should regard laissez-faire prices as only a rough guide to costs and to the demand for "neutral goods".'
71
In Chapter XXXII, further significant passages were added, at the point where, in the first edition, the chapter had concluded. Jay argued: 'one absolute limit must be set to the extension of planning in normal times; and that is the point at which it infringes on personal as opposed to economic freedom.' (Emphasis in original.) Personal freedom was the freedom to choose one's occupation.
Apart from emergency needs like defence, there must, therefore, be no compulsion on a man in a Socialist community to take, or retain, or refuse a job, and the required system of labour must be secured by a flexible system of rewards and inducements.
On the other hand, economic freedom -the freedom to buy or sell, to employ or refrain from employing other people, to manufacture or not manufacture -is a secondary freedom, often approaching a luxury, which can and should be limited in a good cause. [Emphasis in original.]
Between 'personal' and 'economic' freedom, however, stood 'the normal freedom of the consumer to buy what he chooses'. This, Jay stated, should be encouraged wherever possible 'within the framework of the production, income, and employment plan of the country, and of the provision of a national minimum consumption of essentials.' The revised chapter concluded with a statement of three main aims of economic planning:
first, to secure the employment of all resources available 'in at least some useful work'; second to guarantee by means of social insurance a sufficient money income to all unable to earn; and third 'to provide by deliberate organization a sufficient supply of the essential goods and services needed for civilized life at prices which those at the lowest incomes can afford to pay; leaving luxury and semi-luxury goods in general to the tender mercies of the price-cost calculus.' Finally, Jay wrote, 'planning should normally stop short at the point at which personal freedom would be infringed.' 72 Morgan sees the addition of these passages to Chapter XXXII as a sign of Jay's increased commitment to 'the transcendent values of human freedom'. What seems most striking, however, is Jay's insistence on the divisibility of personal and economic freedom; he offered a ringing defence of the former, not the latter. Overall, his textual changes make clear, not only that he was converted to central planning as a general proposition, but that he now believed that the state should have a significantly greater control over the consumption habits of individuals than he had favoured in 1937. The scope for consumer choice had narrowed; the 'gentleman in Whitehall' would have a good deal more say.
Conclusion
The new edition of the book was not widely reviewed. However, the Times Literary Supplement -which in its review of the first edition had suggested that Jay's concessions to the anti-planners would not be accepted by the majority of socialists -noted that The answer is that there had been a convergence on middle ground. Jay's enthusiastic (but in Labour terms belated) embrace of the concept of central planning made him much more of a mainstream voice. Equally, the Labour Party's (admittedly rather inchoate) view of planning had itself mellowed somewhat since the beginning of the war. The tendency to think in terms of rigid budgets of production had declined; and by 1947 the emphasis was very much on 'democratic planning', to be undertaken without compulsion of labour. 75 This was a nebulous concept, but one which Jay explicitly endorsed. 76 As he stated in his November 1947 Fabian lecture, 'We must get away from the idea that planning consists in laying down a series of rigid statistical directives, and the somehow enforcing them on a recalcitrant economy. ... If I had to define planning in a phrase, I
would call it "purposive improvisation".' 77 On the basis of that lecture, in which Jay very clearly stated his conversion to planning, Francis has remarked that 'Labour's vision of socialist planning might have been incoherent and ineffective, but it still had sufficient vitality in the post-war years to withstand total submergence under the new tide of [Keynesian] economic management.' 78 This is a very fair comment. Moreover, Jay's change of views casts doubt on the assumption implicit in many accounts that not only the Keynesian revolution, but the progress of Labour revisionism in general, were essentially heroic sagas in which young intellectuals acted as trailblazers, with the rest of the party stumbling along later in their wake. This is not to say that The Socialist Case in fact had no impact on developments in the forties and fifties. Its original effect on John Strachey, for example, was not undone because Jay later changed his own mind about pricing policy. 79 But it is to point out that, if the war helped stimulate some currents of revisionism, it also provoked powerful cross-currents of anti-revisionism that, in Jay's case at least, were by no means merely the unthinking knee-jerk responses of socialist fundamentalism.
Indeed, his change of heart can be seen, broadly speaking, as sensible and pragmatic. A cynic might suggest that the increased role he envisaged in 1947 for the 'gentleman in Whitehall' was the result of his own taste of power as a war-time civil servant; as bureaucrats will, he had become intoxicated with bureaucracy, and desired to spread its healing benefits to all. Yet, although there may be a certain element of truth in this hypothesis, it should be admitted that a fundamental part of Jay's overall assessment was sound. In 1937, when the key economic issue facing Britain was unemployment, widespread government planning and control of individual consumption -other than, perhaps, for a strictly limited range of necessities -was of dubious relevance and virtue.
In 1947, when Britain's very weak external economic position was matched by conditions of scarcity combined with high levels of pent-up domestic demand, such planning and control was, more than arguably, essential. (Whether or not it should have persisted indefinitely, as Jay seemed to envisage, was another matter.) 80 Of course, for individual consumers this could be deeply frustrating, which helps explain why the 'gentleman in Whitehall' comment, which had apparently caused no-one to bat an eyelid when originally published, now became ripe for exploitation by the Conservatives. It was perhaps inevitable that the 'gentleman in Whitehall', originally invoked as someone who only knew better than the people in a limited range of cases, should become a hated symbol of arrogance and elitism at a time when, out of pressing necessity, he was forced to act as if he knew better than them in virtually the whole field of consumer choice.
